

# Separation Anxiety: Theories of Early Modern Emotion and their Break with Theology<sup>i</sup>

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A 2017 article in *The New Yorker*, entitled “The Pope’s Shrink and Catholicism’s Uneasy Relationship with Freud,” describes the shockwaves that reverberated through the world of the faithful following the revelation that the current Pope, Francis, had undergone psychoanalysis.

“I consulted a Jewish psychoanalyst,” Francis told Wolton. “For six months, I went to her home once a week to clarify certain things. She was very good. She was very professional as a doctor and a psychoanalyst, but she always knew her place.” (qtd. in Carroll)

It might seem remarkable that such a simple statement could occasion such existential horror, given that it is not, on its surface, concerned with religious debate, but the rather more mundane sphere of psychological well-being. However, the reaction is representative of an ongoing issue, with a long and storied history.

Sigmund Freud himself was not a religious individual, although he claims to have retained a sense of his “Jewishness,” a concept which reaches its apogee in *Moses and Monotheism*, published in 1939 (the year Freud died). One of his earliest statements on the topic appears in *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices* in 1907, where he describes religion as a “universal obsessional neurosis” (Rizutto 35).

George Makari has written in *Revolution in Mind* of Freud’s desire to separate the science of psychoanalysis from perceived “Jewishness,” and noted the importance of the pastor’s son Jung in this respect, at least

initially (Makari 2008, 228), but Carroll's article suggests that traces of an anti-Semitic prejudice somehow linger. More fundamental than this, however, is an apparent anxiety over supplantation.

It seems to be the case that there remains a fear, within the Church, of psychoanalysis somehow taking the place of religion in the roster of individual experiences. Rather than turn to academic articles, I chose to see what popular discourse had to offer. A look online reveals concern about this as a common theme in discussions about Catholicism in particular. Take, for example, the following description of Jung from a post on *CatholicCulture.org*:

[Jung was]...dedicated to the destruction of the Catholic Church and the establishment of an anti-Church based on psychoanalysis... Much of what has ailed the Church over the past 30 years—sex education, the abused liturgy, faulty theology, degenerative sexual morality, the mainstreaming of homosexuality, contraception abortion and euthanasia—can be traced back to Jungian ideologues who train teachers to instruct others in their “Jungian Way”. The damaging effects of Jungianism are manifest in our Catholic schools, universities, and seminaries, in our parishes, and Catholic media. We can only rid the Church of this heresy through proper catechetical instruction supplemented by an awareness of those who seek to undermine the true teaching of the Church.

One can find the same concern with regard to supplanting in this interview with the contentious and deeply homophobic Dutch psychologist Gerard J.M Van den Aardweg:

On balance, Freud's negative influence has outweighed his positive influence. I said that he blocked and imprisoned psychology and psychotherapy. But he was tremendously influential in instilling a false view of man in the human sciences in America and in American culture, and was partly responsible for the devastating sexual revolution of the 60s.

To begin with, he reduced the human psyche to a bundle of biological instincts and processes and thereby obscured the reality of human essence, that is, man's immaterial soul with its inherent immaterial "instincts", aspirations, and powers. Mature love was "actually" no more than an outgrowth of the erotic instinct. Conscience was no longer the perception of eternal, supra-human values but a learned set of rules -- like traffic rules -- and so it was abolished, against all the evidence. (qtd. in Cook)

Van den Aardweg is perhaps using hyperbole to appeal to his chosen audience here, but such conservatism is symptomatic of an anxiety about the place of religion in the life of the everyday person.

The discussion in the present paper can be framed in such terms, but is not fundamentally about fears held by contemporary Catholics with regard to psychoanalysis. Instead, it is rooted further back in time, at the outset of the early modern period. What will be argued is that the early modern idea of the emotions was initially a discourse primarily dominated by the Church, especially via the output of Jesuit (and Jesuit-trained) authors, but that this shifted over the course of the seventeenth century and, by the time the Church apparently realised that this control was slipping away, it was too late, and the ground, once secure, was to be contested into the long eighteenth century and beyond.

In Catholicism, the passions could be considered as reflections of The Passion, or the suffering of Christ that was thought to exert such power that its effects were to resonate down through the centuries and form a part of the individual experience of the devout. However, God has a more fundamental relationship with the passions, as *primum movens immobile*, which might be translated loosely as "the first cause, who is uncaused."<sup>iii</sup> The passions come from original sin, which introduced conflict into the harmony of the soul in the pre-Fall state.

Aquinas discussed the passions in the 1265-1274 work *Summa Theologiae* (1a2ae, qq. 22-48), giving life to the idea them as an output of the sensitive appetite, and dividing them into irascible and concupiscible types, although, as Robert Miner has noted in an excellent overview, one should not assume that the former are purely negative, as “hope” is irascible and “hate” concupiscible (25).

Any discussion of the Church and the representation of early modern emotion must touch, however briefly, upon the fundamental instructional text at the outset of the period – the *Spiritual Exercises* of Loyola, composed in Spanish between 1522 and 1524, then later translated into Latin for wider dissemination. In the Third Annotation, God is centralised as the source of emotion:

...we use acts of the intellect in reasoning, and acts of the will in movements of the feelings: let us remark that, in the acts of the will, when we are speaking vocally or mentally with God our Lord, or with His Saints, greater reverence is required on our part than when we are using the intellect in understanding. (12)

This was how matters stood as the seventeenth century hove into view, and the work of Jesuits such as Thomas Wright gained influence, a figure placed in the context of the development of modern theories of perception in *Soul Machine* (Makari 2015, 91-92). Wright had a Jesuit education and his 1601 *Passions of the Minde in Generall* is a work of moral philosophy. It is part of the larger tradition of exploratory texts on psychology prevalent in the sixteenth century, but is notable for its comprehensive study of such a specific subject. Overall, he advances the proposition that moral acts are those which control or set aside the influences from troublesome passions, themselves derived from original sin (Ralph 58).

Here, one can see the passions retaining a connection to the tenets of

Catholicism. Morality is tied to self-denial, which is a theme that goes well back into the Classical period, but is here linked to the Christian idea of the origins of such negatively-perceived impulses. Further editions of the *Passions* appeared in 1604, 1620-21 and 1630, suggesting that the work enjoyed continued popularity in the first few decades of the seventeenth century.

According to Wright, the passions will be stimulated when properly employed in an oratorical context by one who feels them him (or, for a less misogynistic author, her) self:

I remember a Preacher in Italy who had such power over his Auditors' affections that when it pleased him he could cause them to shed an abundance of tears, yea, and with tears dropping down their cheeks presently turn their sorrow into laughter; and the reason was that he himself being extremely passionate, knowing moreover the Art of moving the affections of those Auditors. And besides that, the most part were women that heard him, whose passions are most vehement and mutable; therefore he might have persuaded them what he listed. (90)

In his definition of passions and affections, Wright considers three actions that come from the soul, of which the passions are the middle ground, standing between the internal and external. This is very similar to the later ideas of the degrees of souls given by Nicholas Coeffeteau in his *Table of Humane Passions* of 1615. Passions work either for or against a kind of internal sense of what is morally acceptable, and are able to create a connection between the soul and the body:

These passions...be certain internal acts or operations of the soul, bordering upon reason and sense, prosecuting some good thing or flying some ill thing, causing therewithal some alteration in the body. ( 94-95)

The passions tend to be influenced by sense more powerfully than by reason, because they have a stronger resemblance to the former than to the latter:

For passions are drowned in corporal organs and instruments, as well as sense; reason dependeth of no corporal subject, but as a Princess in her throne considereth the state of her kingdom. Passions and sense are determined to one thing, and as soon as they perceive their object presently receive it and the passions love or hate it; but reason, after she perceiveth her object, she stands in deliberation whether it be convenient she should accept it or refuse it. (95)

“Inordinate affections” (97) spring from self-love, or selfishness. These negative passions, however, can be directed towards good causes, presumably allowing a moral path to be followed at all times. Aquinas as interpreted by Wright gives eleven passions in total: love, desire or concupiscence, delight or pleasure, hatred, abomination and sadness or pain are those belonging to covetousness, and hope, despair, fear, audacity and ire are those associated with the invading appetite (106). In contrast, Aristotle reduces the passions only to pleasure and pain in the *Ethics*. Wright himself contends that there are six primary passions, love, desire, pleasure, hatred, fear and sadness (108), and all other passions such as envy, anxiety, slothfulness and so forth can be seen only as members of these categories. There are passions of the soul, but the passions of the mind are resident in the heart (114):

...if we taste delicate meats, smell musk, or hear music, we perceive not only that the heart is affected but also the passion of joy delighteth those parts of our senses. The like we prove in pain and grief, for which cause commonly we say our teeth ache, our fingers, toes, or legs pain us. Pain, therefore, and Pleasure, being Passions of the Mind, and evermore felt in that part of the body where Sense exerciseth her operations, therefore, as touching is dispersed through the whole body, even so the Passions of pleasure and pain... (115)

The process by which passions are moved is also very similar to Coeffeteau's descriptions (123):

- 1) Sense or memory convey an object to the imagination
- 2) Pure spirits flock from the "former part of the brain" to the heart
- 3) They present the object to the heart, which makes a decision
- 4) In order to make this decision, the heart draws on humours which modify mood
- 5) Additional humours are sent by the sense or memory

Wright argues that the reason and the passions are often in conflict, and uses the metaphor of a state to explain this concept:

By two ways the Subjects of every Commonweal usually disturb the State and breed civil broils therein: the first is when they rise up and rebel against their King, the second is when they brawl one with another and so cause riots and tumults; the former is called Rebellion, the latter Sedition. After the same manner Passions either rebel against Reason, their Lord and King, or oppose themselves one against another; that I call *Contradiction*, this *Contrariety*...This internal Combat and spiritual Contradiction every spiritual man daily perceiveth, for inordinate Passions, will he, nil he, cease not almost hourly to rise up against Reason, and so molest him, troubling the rest and quietness of his soul. (141)

The mortification, or control of these passions forms the subject of the third book. Methods of control are based primarily on identifying the prevailing passions in oneself (avoiding the pitfalls of self-love in the process) and acting directly against them, by such means as the avoidance of the circumstances which inflame them, mortification of the body, or prayer.

The last book of the work, Book Six, is concerned with the defects of the soul, which proceed in the most part from internal blindness and self-love

in combination with ignorance. Wright gives various reasons, including poor education and an over-fondness for the wrong sort of book or play, as to how these defects are made apparent and fostered, concluding with the example of a “lewd woman” who commits adultery. As an aside, his misogyny is apparent throughout the work, and women are generally advanced as examples of the worst effects of passions.

In terms of theological connectivity, “the provenance of God” is the intermediary in the process of perception, and the passions derive from the disharmony of original sin. The precepts of Catholic faith are inextricable from the process of emotion, both facilitating through the smoothness of the interventionary process and admonishing through moral appeals to reason and will.

Nicolas Coeffeteau (1574-1623), mentioned at several points in the preceding discussion, was a French Dominican priest noted for his understanding of Aristotle and Aquinas. His *Table of Humane Passions* had three editions, in 1615, 1620 and 1623, as well as an English translation. It begins with the assertion that “...no man embraceth any design whatsoever, until that knowledge be united with desire, and desire joined unto knowledge” (582). This theme of the duality of knowledge and desire is fairly constant throughout the selection. Coeffeteau offers an explanation as to why both the physical and intellectual desires motivate man:

...we must remember that the soul, being the form of living things, and natural forms having this in particular, that the more noble contains the perfection of that which is less noble; as a quadrangle comprehends with a certain eminency all that enters into the composition of a triangle; and as the forms of Beasts contain the forms of the Elements; it follows that there being three degrees of souls; that is to say, that which gives life, which is the less perfect; that which gives sense, which is the second rank; and the Reasonable, which is the noblest of all; this Reasonable soul,



which is peculiar only to man, contains all the powers and perfections of the other, and can effect as much as all the rest together. By reason whereof man hath a Vegetative soul, which is common with plants; he hath the Sensitive, which he hath common with brute beasts; but he alone is in possession of the Reasonable soul, whereby he hath nothing common with the rest of the creatures. (583)

For Coeffeteau, the “Natural Appetite” is the controlling power over the Vegetative soul, but must be accompanied by “Knowledge” in man. For creatures with only the Vegetative soul, this role is taken by “universal Nature”, which dictates proper action. The Sensitive soul has possession of knowledge, along with “...the faculty to know, the faculty to desire, and the moving power” (584). The last of these is the power to move from one place to another, guided by knowledge in combination with desire. For this type of soul, Coeffeteau follows Aquinas in distinguishing two “Appetitive powers” which seem to relate to prevailing passions. These are “...the Concupiscible or desiring power, and the Irascible or angry power; the one of which without the other sufficeth not for the health of the creatures” (585). This parallel to theories of the passions and humours is made clearer in further discussion:

...this last [the Irascible], when as any difficulty ariseth and opposeth itself to the desire of the Concupiscible, comes presently to succour it; and inflaming the blood, excites choler, hope, courage, or some other like passion destined and ordained to make him surmount the difficulties which cross the contentment of the soul. For that which concerns the powers of the Sensitive soul, there remains none but the faculty moving from one place to another, which is dispersed and resides in the sinews, muscles and ligaments, and which is dispersed over all the members of the creature. This power, being commanded by the Appetite, doth presently exercise his office, serving for an instrument to that part of the blood which for the great subtlety and pureness thereof hath gotten the name of Spirit. (586)

Finally, in the discussion of the Reasonable soul, Coeffeteau distinguishes two “principal powers”. These are “Understanding”, connected with knowledge, and “Will, capable of desire. The latter is guided by the former in the motivation of the individual, and Coeffeteau is able to use this theory to provide a more complete picture of the soul, including a discussion on why imagination exists:

The office of our Understanding, particularly of that which we call possible, is to receive, and in receiving to know, and in knowing to offer unto the Will those kinds or forms which are sent unto it from the Imagination. It is true that, being a more noble power than the Sensitive, it cannot receive those images and forms so material, gross, and sensible as they are of themselves in their particular being, for that they are not proportionable to the purity and excellency of her condition. By reason whereof the philosophers have placed in our souls another power wonderfully noble, whose office is to purge and clothe as it were with a new lustre all the images or forms which are to be found in the Imagination or fantasy; and by the means of this light, to cause those forms which were material, sensible, and singular to become so purified from these earthly conditions as they seem universal, and so well proportioned to the pureness of our Understanding as they easily receive the impression. (586)

Thus, the imagination becomes a sort of filter for the base world, converting information into a Platonic ideal form. Coeffeteau felt that there was a hierarchy of these behavioural elements, and that the “less noble” would bow to the “more noble”, with Reason given dominance over the Will. The process of observation, evaluation and response runs along the following lines:

- 1) Exterior senses gather forms of things “from without”
- 2) Common sense receives, judges and distinguishes
- 3) They are then presented to the Imagination, which gathers them together in order to be able to represent them in future
- 4) The forms then move to the Memory

- 5) Thence to the Appetite, “under the appearance of things that are pleasing or troublesome, that is to say, under the form of good and evil” (587).
- 6) “...at the same instant the same forms, enlightened with the light of the Understanding, and purged from the Sensible and singular conditions which they retain in the Imagination, and instead of that which they represented of particular things, representing them in general, they become capable to be embraced by the Understanding...” (587).
- 7) The Understanding, having made a generalization of the forms as either good or evil, represents them to the Will
- 8) The Will makes a decision as to “...what they shall embrace and what they shall fly as it pleaseth her...” (587).
- 9) The Sensitive Appetite obeys, and “...quickeneth all the powers and passions over which she commands, and sets to work those which are necessary to that action, and by their means commands the moving power, dispersed over all the members, to follow or fly, to approach or to recoil, or to do any other motion which it requireth” (587).

Naturally, Coeffeteau concludes by noting that this is how Man ought to behave, but that often one is prone to a “disordered Appetite”, due to such factors as custom, bad education, unsound organs or just plain “bad inclination” of the Will. God is here present both as the progenitor of perception and via the light of the understanding, noted in stages six and seven. Again, the unruly passions spring from the psychic disorder caused by the Fall.

Both Wright and Coeffeteau followed, therefore, a system which centralised religious doctrine within the chain of perception in terms of passions. This seemed eminently reasonable to thinkers of their time and an unassailable position from which to consider the human experience. Writing on the same period, Makari mentions the debates centering on the work of Mersenne and Gassendi, particularly Mersenne’s fear of “a God-like force in Nature” (11). Fears of supplantation were beginning to emerge.

However, a titanic work was to come along which challenged these fundamentals far more significantly, no matter how unintentionally. In 1649, the Jesuit-educated Rene Descartes published his *Passions of the Soul*. This work explores what Voss dubs, in his introduction to the translation, "... the technology of the emotions" (viii). It was known in England soon after publication, as an anonymous translation appeared in 1650. Descartes is here concerned with ideas of soul and body in union, inverting the traditional idea of the Platonists and others (20-21), who argue that the sensitive soul would cause effects in the body. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis makes this point in her introduction to the Voss edition of the treatise:

For the scholastics, Platonists, and neo-Stoics, "*anima*" and "*spiritus*" designate the soul, or breath, which "animates the body: they distinguish the sensitive and vital functions from the intellectual part, which has its seat in the brain, the others being referred to the heart and the belly. Physiological disruptions – rapid heartbeat, rise in temperature, and so on – are then *effects* of an agitation of the sensitive soul. According to Descartes, the mind submits to the action of the body before reacting: the *passions of the soul* are truly so called. (xvii)

The pineal gland is apparently the tool in the body used by the soul to exercise its effects "...by the mediation of spirits nerves, and even blood, which, participating in the impressions of the spirits, can carry them through the arteries into all the members" (37). Descartes identifies this gland's purpose as all other parts of the brain are duplicated; the single organ, therefore, is used to coalesce dual impressions, such as those from the eyes or ears, into single objects for the easy apprehension of the soul (37). Even so, the indivisible soul is joined to all of the body at once (35).

Thought is the province of the soul, but; "...all the heat and all the movements which are in us, insofar as they do not depend on thought, belong to the body alone" (20). The "animal spirits" are contained in nerve fibres, and

are produced in the brain from the “fine parts of the blood” (22-24). The body is capable of movement by sheer mechanical process, “...in the same way in which a watch’s movement is produced by the sheer force of its spring and the shape of its wheels” (27). The thoughts are of two sorts:

...there remains nothing in us that we should attribute to our soul but our thoughts, which are principally of two genera – the first, namely, are the actions of the soul; the others are its passions. The ones I call its actions are all of our volitions, because we find by experience that they come directly from our soul and seem to depend only on it; as, on the other hand, all the sorts of cases of perception or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called its passions, because it is often not our soul that makes them such as they are, and because it always receives them from things that are represented by them. (28)

The body can affect perceptions, either through the nerves or through illusion caused by the spirits entering the wrong pores in the brain (29). Perceptions belonging to the body are physically based, such as hunger or thirst, as well as pain, heat and so forth (32). Those of the soul are felt only in the soul, such as joy and anger. Descartes is scathing towards those who believe that the seat of the passions is the heart, noting that such a theory “... is not worth considering” (37). The action of the pineal gland is not the same in everyone, due to differences in the disposition of the brain (40). The effect of passions is to dispose the body for action: fear leads to flight, boldness to battle and so on (40-41):

...the whole action of the soul consists in this: merely by willing something, it makes the little gland to which it is closely joined move in the way required to produce the effect corresponding to this volition. (41)

The passions cannot, however, be moved in this way as directly. There must be a process of reason or argument (43). Descartes rejects the concept,


advanced in different ways by both Plato and Aristotle, that there are higher, or rational, and lower, or sensitive, parts of the soul. He sees the body as the seat of everything opposed to reason (44-45).

God becomes an absent Father in such a system. The existence of a Deity is certainly not rejected or questioned, yet the body itself is sufficient to explain how passions might arise. One can trace the roots of potential cause for Catholic concern back even further to the famous *cogito*, which first appeared in 1637's *Discourse on the Method*. If the individual is the touchstone of understanding, then it is easy to see why the Church might object. Descartes was himself a Catholic, however his work here takes divine influence out of the chain of perception. It is tempting to see Descartes as highly influential in his time. As the individual most associated with Cartesian philosophy and the originator of the *cogito* – perhaps the single most famous statement in philosophy – he is rightly regarded today as a towering figure. However, he was afraid of backlash before his death and his work was to become contentious afterwards. An example of the first is his voluntary suppression of several writings, fearing the kind of reception that Galileo received.

The Catholics – and the Jesuits in particular – responded aggressively to the challenge his ideas created. The works of Descartes were placed on the *Index librorum prohibitorum*. This took place in 1663. Additionally, there were several pedagogic texts produced which attempted to bring the question of emotional processes back into the Catholic sphere of influence – to re-theologise the debate. One of these is the *Quaestiones disputandae de passionibus seu affectibus*, which is a book by the Jesuit priest Father Martino de Esparza, published in Rome in 1660, with a subsequent edition produced in Pottendorff by Hieronymus Verdussen, published in 1668. The initial volume was approved by Gosuvinus Nickel, the *Praepositus Generalis* (General Commander) of the Society of Jesuits.

The book has the *imprimatur* of two other leading Jesuits and thus one

can imagine that there was clearly no lack of official support for the volume.



**Fig. 1: Title-page of the *Quaestiones***

There are forty-six *quaestiones* on offer, with the whole list given at the start of the volume and unpacked in the following six hundred and four pages. Some representative questions to consider include:

- #1 Utrum passio sit actus apititus sensitiui? (Whether passions are actions of the sensitive appetites)
- #3 Utrum omnes passiones sint malae? (Whether all the passions are bad)
- #4 Utrum passiones naturaliter subsint imperio rationis superioris? (Whether the emotions will naturally be subject to the rule of higher thought)
- #20 Utrum delectatio sit mensura bonitatis rerum omnium? (Whether pleasure is the measure of the goodness of all things)

As one would expect, the Catholic God is at the centre of many of these discussions. Some samples include *Quaestio XVII*; Utrum delectatio sit passio quietatiua animalis? (Whether pleasure calms animal passions). The following is offered:

Gaudium autem non est passio, quia convenit Deo etiam, & Angelis, qui sunt expertes passionum. Ergo nec delectatio est passio. ... In appetitu autem rationali nulla est passio, sed solum in sensitivo, ut dictum est supra. (183)

(Joy is not a feeling, that belongs to God and the Angels, who are devoid of emotions Thus, pleasure is a passion. It amounts to an amount of pleasure, and indeed there is more of a rational appetite, which is a sensitive appetite. ... In this sense that there is no reason within passion, but only the sensitive, as explained earlier.)

Here, the doctrine that God and Angels are beyond the passions themselves is expressed. This can be found in both Catholic and Protestant texts in various forms, as in the Scottish Presbyterian preacher and philosopher Thomas Boston's note that "there are no Passions in God, properly speaking: they are inconsistent with his absolute unchangeableness" (132) in his classic of eighteenth-century theology, *Human Nature in its Fourfold State*, for example.

The causes of pleasure are addressed in *Quaestio XVIII*; Utrum causa delectationis sit bonum praesens, ac possessum? (Whether the good of the cause of pleasure is present, and its property), where one finds, as part of the answer the statement that "... ut pate in Deo, qui est finis ultimus omnium" (this is clear in God, who is the last end of all things.)

In *Quaestio XX*; Utrum delectatio sit mensura bonitatis rerum omnium? (Whether pleasure is the measure of the goodness of all things), the reply includes this proviso:

Patet autem eandem esse proportionaliter rationem de bonis intelligibilibus infra Deum, comparatione delectationis spiritualis. (239)

(It is clear, however, that the same is in proportion to the good of the intellect lesser than God, in comparison to the pleasure of the spiritual man.)



Pleasures and passions are denigrated and spiritual feelings are privileged. The passions are, once more, based on Aquinas, and the struggle between the higher and lower selves as both rationalism versus sensibility and the spiritual self versus the base forms the discourse here. Finally, in *Quaestio XLV*; *Utrum remedia passionum sint solae virtutes?* (Whether the cures for the passions are only virtues), one finds yet another reference to the place of God in the chain of perception and emotion, with mention of:

Dona Dei, quibus homo participat naturam divinam, qua est origo Sanctitatis, moresque imitatur divinos, ea enim vero, quo maiora, ac praestantiora sunt, reddunt ipsum magis aptam coniunctioni cum Deo ... (575) (God's gifts, whereby man is participating in the nature of the divine, which is the origin of holiness, and moral virtues, by which it imitates the holy, those things you have in truth, the greater, the more excellent things, and they render the proper setting for the union with God...)

However, the battle was being lost on a broader front. Across the Channel, Britain was experimenting with mechanism, perhaps most memorably expressed by the anthropic materialist Hobbes, whose 1651 idea of the body included the concept of a system of will and passions that was purely based on the interplay between desire and perception, appetite and aversion. This was followed/challenged by Empiricism, first through Locke and then onwards, in the eighteenth century, via Berkeley and Hume.

Britain was, by the mid-point of the seventeenth century, a stoutly non-Catholic country. For all the pretensions of the post-Restoration monarchy in the form of Charles II and James II, and fears of "Popish Plots," acts such as the Clarendon Code ensured the primacy of the Church of England. This meant that the writing of a Jesuit priest such as Martino de Esperza would have had little or no impact on the prevailing intellectual currents of the day, and the Enlightenment was looming. In fact, scholars such as the inimitable Roy

Porter have argued that it really began in England in the seventeenth century (409). Prominent pre-Hobbes and pre-Locke accounts of the emotions had already been conducted by figures such as the Presbyterian Edward Reynolds, whose 1640 work *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man: With the Severall Dignities and Corruptions Thereunto Belonging* has a view of the process of perception which is certainly theologised (see, for example, the discussion of “Spiritual Desires” on page 163), but just as certainly a non-Jesuitical work. Instead, it relies much more on the Scottish homiletic rhetorical tradition of the seventeenth-century protestant preacher, with the concomitant subdued decorum that characterised post-Reformation Christianity in the most idiomatically British of its variants (i.e., something that one might characterise, perhaps, as “phlegmatic Calvinism”).

The space between Hobbes and Hume can be characterised in terms of an increasing secularization of the debate on the form and function of emotions in the early modern period that such works supported, whilst simultaneously keeping a kind of discourse of religious homage in play. Locke, famously, was non-tolerant of atheists and Catholics both, as explicated in an excellently lucid recent discussion by Diego Lucci, yet the heavily Christian Locke’s work did contribute to the de-theologisation of the concept of perception, with the notable caveat that the highest revelatory function of reason is a direct communication from God (qtd. in Lucci 209).

From this broad period, perhaps one representative example will suffice. This is the work of the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, who was, like Reynolds, a Presbyterian. To quote from *Soul Machine*:

[Hutcheson]...believed with Shaftesbury that an innate moral sense was the primary..motivation for human, and the source of their emotions. ... Ethics and social stability rested, not on the Good Book, but on this natural state of shared compassion, what he called a “sympathy” between human beings. (Makari 2015, 167)

There is a story relevant to this assertion. What happened was that Hutcheson originally published his seminal work *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions* in 1728, which contains the following note in the Preface:

The last *Section* of the *Fourth Treatise*, was occasion'd by a private Letter from a Person of the most real Merit, in *Glasgow*; representing to me some Sentiments not uncommon among good Men, which might prejudice them against any Scheme of *Morals*, not wholly founded upon *Piety*. This Point is, I hope, so treated, as to remove the Difficulty. (xxi)

In other words, Hutcheson was criticised for initially advancing a system which, like the concepts of Descartes, seemed to allow for a conception free of God. This led to his appending a lengthy justification for the place of God in passions and the development of a moral sense (314-30). His response is more than simple lip service or a kneejerk reaction, but it is still significant in that the objection made was not really on advanced philosophical grounds, resulting in a response due to a public perception of decency of thought. Hutcheson seemed not to wish to shock or outrage his audience.

This debate on the passions and the nature of perception was to continue into the long eighteenth century, but the tide had turned in the seventeenth. Evidence of this contested ground is apparent in the work of Robert Wightman, author of a 1738 discussion on the passions, who resolutely refused to let the de-theologising of emotions pass into history, yet who wrote a work which was more homiletic than philosophical, and seemed aware at the same time that he was fighting something of a losing battle, and who would have been appalled at the thought that he was in any way doing something approved of (however distantly) by Jesuits:

There are Men, who resolve every Perception of the Mind into bodily Constitution; and therefore resolutely reject the Doctrine of invisible Agency and Influence; but their Theory is so full of Inexplicables and

Inconsistencies, that it is not tenible; such Men were Hobbes, and Spinoza, whose Sentiments were only odd and new, but neither just nor true ... (68)

The largest part of the process which the present discussion examines took place between the Reformation and the Enlightenment. The tussling over the placement of God in the processes of perception and emotion was symptomatic of a wider anxiety about the supplanting of religion in society at large. Given how the role of faith has transformed subsequently, this has not proven to be an unreasonable fear, although a not inconsiderable time had to pass before one could truly say that religion had been almost completely sidelined in pre-Freudian psychology, clearing the way for remarkable things to come.

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<sup>ii</sup> Unless noted otherwise, all translations from Latin are those of the author of the present paper.

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### **Figures**

Figure One: Photograph of the Title-Page of the *Quaestiones Disputandae seu Affectibus de Passionibus*. 22 Jan. 2019. Taken by the Author from an original copy in their personal collection.